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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E. L. MURPHY TRUCKING
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CLIMATE CONTROL, INC.,
Defendant-Respondent,

Case No.
13555

vs.
AMERICAN STANDARD, INC.,
Co-Defendant — Co-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S

BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by an interstate motor carrier to
recover freight charges from the consignee on four shipments of goods delivered to and accepted by the consignee.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On cross motions for Summary Judgment, Judge
Stewart M. Hanson granted Respondent's and Co-Re1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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spondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds
that the Appellant was estopped from recovering the
unpaid freight charges and denied Appellant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the Amended
Order granting Summary Judgment to the Respondent
and Co-Respondent and a reversal of the Order denying
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the
alternative, vacating the Order for Summary Judgment
and remanding the case for further proceedings.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On December 20, 1972, a complaint (R-195) was
filed by the Appellant to recover from the Respondent
$7,283.20 for freight charges resulting from the transportation of four truckloads of air conditioning units from
Carteret, New Jersey, to Salt Lake City, together with
interest on that amount at the rate of eight percent (8%)
per year from November 16, 1971.
2. The air conditioning units delivered by the Appellant, E. L. Murphy Trucking Company, were units
ordered by the Respondent, Climate Control, Inc., from
the Co-Respondent, American Standard, Inc., pursuant to
a purchase order contract (R-185) entered into between
the parties which specifically prescribed that freight
charges were to be prepaid by American Standard, Inc.

2
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3. Climate Control, Inc. paid American Standard,
Inc. the sum of $100,000.00 (R-124) on December 30,
1971, and a balance of $65,280.78 on January 14, 1972,
pursuant to their contract and that such sum constituted
payment in full for both the air conditioning units and
freight charges incurred in transporting them from New
Jersey to Salt Lake City.
4. Upon receiving a purchase order from Climate
Control, Inc. for the air conditioning units, American
Standard, Inc. contracted with a New Jersey company,
B & M Trading Company, to pick up the air conditioning
units at the American Standard plant in Carteret, New
Jersey, for shipment to Climate Control in Salt Lake City
(R-41).
5. On November 9, 1971, American Standard, Inc.
sent B & M Trading Company a check (No. 9765) in the
amount of $16,771.17 (R-40) to cover the freight charges
for the air conditioning units and also to cover freight
charges for at least one other unrelated shipment.
6. B & M Trading Company contracted with another
New Jersey company, East Coast Drayage Company (consignor), to deliver the air conditioning units to Salt Lake
City.
7. East Coast Drayage Company contracted with E.
L. Murphy Trucking Company to transport the air conditioning units for shipment on November 5, 1971 under
Bills of Lading (R-163-166) which named Climate Control as consignee and East Coast Drayage as consignor.

3
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8. Two of the four Bills of Lading were unmarked
(R~ 164-165), that is, they did not indicate on their face
whether they were "Prepaid" or "To Be Prepaid". The
other two Bills of Lading were marked as being either
"Prepaid" or "To Be Prepaid". (R 166 and 163). Each
Bill of Lading covered a separate shipment delivered by
four trucks at different times during a two-day period.
9. The air conditioning units were delivered and
accepted by Climate Control on or about November 1516, 1971 (R-79.
10. E. L. Murphy Trucking Company first billed
East Coast Drayage Company on November 17 and 18,
1971 (R-79) within the seven (7) day period prescribed
by the I.C.C. Regulations.
11. E. L. Murphy Trucking Company virtually had
daily communications with East Coast Drayage Company
from the date of billing, including personal visits by E.
L. Murphy's representatives, and although receiving
promises that payment would be made, were unable to
collect the charges that were due.
12. Continuous attempts were made from February
to April 7, 1972 to collect from East Coast Drayage Company (R-83, 84), after which time E. L. Murphy was advised by their New Jersey counsel that East Coast Drayage
Company was in financial difficulties and was probably
judgment-proof. On May 5, 1972 (R-94), American Standard was notified that Murphy was not able to collect from
East Coast Drayage.

4
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13. Subsequently the matter of collection was turned
over to an attorney in Salt Lake City and an action was
filed on December 20, 1972 naming Climate Control,
Inc. as defendant. Immediately thereafter, Climate Control, Inc. joined American Standard, Inc. as third party defendant and still subsequently, by motion, the plaintiff
joined American Standard, Inc. as co-defendant.
14. In preparation for the Motions for Summary
Judgment, Murphy obtained an Affidavit (R-19) from
Mr. John Dillon, Vice President of Climate Control, Inc.,
on October 19, 1973, stating that the payment of
$165,280.78 to American Standard for the air conditioning
units delivered by E. L. Murphy Trucking Company was
based on the following:
(a) the invoices submitted to Climate Control, Inc.
by American Standard,
(b) the assurance of Evan Beauldegard that the goods
specified in the invoices were received, and
(c) that the invoices of E. L. Murphy Trucking
Company were not considered by Climate Control and were not relied upon by Climate Control when payment of the above monies were
made to American Standard, Inc.
15. The motions for cross summary judgment were
heard on October 29, 1973 with an amended order (R-l)
subsequently entered by the Court granting the motions
of Climate Control and American Standard and denying
the motion of E. L. Murphy for Summary Judgment.

5
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING CLIMATE CONTROLS A N D AMERICAN STANDARD'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AS THE RECORD FAILS
TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT BASED ON
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.
It is well settled that before the Doctrine of Equitable
Estoppel can be applied to prevent a party from enforcing
a right, it is essential that it be affirmatively shown that
a representation has been made which induced the other
party to rely upon that representation to his detriment.
Equitable estoppel is applied only as a defense. It thus
operates as a shield and not as a sword. The party invoking estoppel must show that they relied on and acted upon
the declarations or conduct of the party sought to be
estopped and was misled thereby. 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel
and Waiver Sect. 1 et seq.; Northern State Construction
Co. v. Robbins et al, 76 Wash. 2d 357, 457 P.2d 187,
(1969).
In the matter currently under review, the Respondent
Climate Control, Inc., set forth, in its amended answer, the
affirmative defense of estoppel, alleging that E. L. Murphy
was estopped from asserting its claim for carrier charges
on each shipment as set forth in its Complaint on the
grounds that Climate Control, Inc., relying on the Bills
of Lading evidencing "Freight Prepaid", fully paid for
all freight charges attendant to the transactions.

6
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in other words, if Climate Control's defense of estoppel is to prevail, it is essential that Climate Control establish from the record that each shipment covered by a separate Bill of Lading was, in fact, marked "Prepaid" and
that they did, in fact, rely upon each Bill of Lading when
paying the freight charges and, but for the representations, would have not paid the freight charges which
were then due.
In reviewing the Bills of Lading, the Courts attention is respectfully directed to the fact that only Bill of
Lading 2930 was marked "To Be Prepaid" and that only
Bill of Lading 2931 was marked "Prepaid". The other
two shipments, covered by Bills of Lading 2926 and 2918
were unmarked and did not indicate on their face whether
the Bills of Lading were or were not prepaid. The only
document submitted to Climate Control upon delivery
of each shipment was the corresponding Bill of Lading.
Where the party invoking estoppel was not induced to act
to his detriment or did not rely on the representations
made by the party sought to be estopped, the defense of
estoppel cannot be sustained. Farmers & Merchants Bank
v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation, 4 Utah 2d 155,
289 P.2d 1045 (1955); Green v. Gam, 11 Utah 2d 375,
359 P.2d 1050, (1961).
All other papers relating to the transaction, such as
shipping orders and invoices, were either retained by
Murphy or submitted to East Coast Drayage. The fact
that two of the Bills of Lading were unmarked (R 164165) and did not indicate on their face whether the shipment was or was not prepaid, placed Climate Control on
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notice that two of the shipments may not have been prepaid. It also placed Climate Control on notice that they
ought to make inquiry as to whether the other two shipments may have been mistakenly marked "Prepaid".
If Climate Control and American Standard are to
prevail in their defense of estoppel, it is essential that the
record support the allegation that the Bills of Lading were
marked "Prepaid" and that they relied on such declarations to their detriment. The record, and particularly the
Affidavit executed by John Dillon, Vice President of Climate Control, Inc., supports E. L. Murphy's position that
Climate Control did not in any way rely upon Murphy's
Bills of Lading in making payment but rather paid the
freight charges pursuant to their obligation arising from
the contract entered into with American Standard. As
the Affidavit states, the money paid to American Standard for the goods delivered by Murphy was based on,
(1) invoices of American Standard, and (2) assurance of
one Evan Beauldegard (employee of Climate Control,
Inc.) that the goods delivered by E. L. Murphy were, in
fact, received.
In addition, Mr. Dillon states in his Affidavit that
the Bills of Lading of E. L. Murphy Trucking Company
were not relied upon by Climate Control in making payment to American Standard. This means that Murphy's
Bills of Lading could not have misled, or induced, or influenced, or, for that matter, played any part at all in
Climate Control making payment to American Standard.
E. L. Murphy submits that the record clearly supports
Murphy's position that neither Climate Control nor

8
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American Standard relied on Murphy's Bills of Lading as
alleged by Climate Control in its answer. In the absence
of reliance, the defense of estoppel cannot be sustained.
To fii rther siippoi: t E, L. Murphy's position that the
lower court erred in granting Climate Control's and
American Standard's Motions for Summary Judgment,
the Court's attention is directed to Northern State Construction Co. v. Robbins et al, supra. This case sets forth
the proposition that estoppel cannot be based upon representations which tend to induce a party to do an act which
he is legally bound to do.
When the above proposition is applied to the case
under review, it is E. L. Murphy's position that since Climate Control was obligated under its contract with American Standard to pay American Standard for the carrier
charges, Climate Control cannot now claim that its payment was based on any representation made by E, L. Murphy Trucking Co. Climate Control's legal obligation to
American Standard could not in any way be affected by
what E. L. Murphy may have done or by what E. L. Murphy may not have done. Climate Control is alleging, in
essence, that E. L. Murphy Trucking Co. should be estopped because Climate Control was induced to do what it
was legally bound to do under its contract with American
Standard. This is contrary to the basic principles of equity
and justice,
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POINT

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE CASES CITED BY CLIMATE CONTROL & AMERICAN STANDARD AS BASIS
FOR GRANTING THEIR MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Climate Control and American Standard relied on
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. National Milling Co.,
409 F. 2d 882 (3rd Cir., 1969) and Consolidated Freightways Corporation v. Admiral Corporation, 442 F. 2d 56
(7th Cir. 1971) as support for their Motions for Summary
Judgment. E. L. Murphy respectfully points out that estoppel cannot be subjected to fixed and settled rules having
universal application and cannot be hampered by the
narrow confines of a technical formula. Dalton Hwy. Dist.
v. Souder, 88 Idaho 550, 401 P. 2d 813 (1965). Each case
of estoppel must stand on its own bottom. Houston County
Board of Review v. Poyner, 236 Ala. 384, 182 So. 455.
(1938).
In the Missouri Pacific case, the facts were substantially different from the matter currently under appeal. For
example, all of the Bills of Lading were marked "Prepaid"
and, in addition thereto, the record included an uncontradicted Affidavit by the president of the company, clearly
reciting facts which established an estoppel against the
railroad. In the instant case, all of the Bills of Lading
were not marked "Prepaid" and, further, the Affidavit
from the Vice President of Climate Control clearly establishes that Climate Control did not rely upon Murphy's
Bills of Lading in making payment.
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The Missouri Pacific case certainly does not stand
for the proposition that a carrier is summarily estopped
from collecting unpaid carrier charges from a consignee
on four shipments when only one of the four Bills of Lading is marked "Prepaid". Nor does the Missouri Pacific
case stand for the proposition that equitable estoppel can
be established and upheld in the absence of a clear showing that the party asserting estoppel did, in fact, rely upon
representations made by the party sought to be estopped.
In the Admiral case, as in the Missouri case, all of
the Bills of Lading were marked "Prepaid" and the carrier's contention of nonreliance was factually unsupported. In addition, the Court put considerable weight on the
carrier's acts of extending credit beyond the seven (7) day
limit imposed by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
According to the section of the Interstate Commerce Act
relating to credit, 9 C.F.R. 1322.1, the carrier may extend
credit to the shipper for a period of seven days. In the
case now before the Court, the Appellant billed the shipper within two days after delivery and continually thereafter made attempts on :t daily basis to collect the charges
due. The fact that Appellant was diligent in attempting
to seek payment of the carrier charges is not denied or
contradicted by either Climate Control or American Standard. Murphy submits that it was not the intent of Congress
to penalize and prevent a carrier from obtaining payment
of all or part of the money due from a consignee if payment from a consignor cannot be collected within a Period of seven days. If this interpretation is given n, ::n>
provision of the Interstate Commerce Act, it would nn-.m
that a carrier would never collect unpaid frc-i^hi ; har.ue^
11 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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from a consignee because, in essentially every instance, it
would take at least seven days for the carrier to determine
whether the consignor was able or would pay the carrier
charges. E. L. Murphy submits that the purpose of the
provision was to prevent preferred and prejudicial treatment by a carrier of one consignor over another. The
seven day limitation was imposed to prevent discrimination and was not imposed for the benefit of the consignee.
Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Del. v. Eddy,
513 P 2d 1161,
Or
(1973)
The Court further stated in the Admiral case that
since all of the Bills of Lading were marked "Prepaid",
Admiral was under no obligation to check with the carrier
to see if payment was in fact received by the carrier. In
the instant case, however, all of the Bills of Lading were
not marked "Prepaid". This, Murphy submits, placed an
obligation upon Climate Control to inquire and determine
if E. L. Murphy was, in fact, paid. Failing to do so,
any payments made by Climate Control should be construed as being made at Climate Control's own risk. Had
Climate Control made an inquiry to E. L. Murphy, E. L.
Murphy would have advised them that they did not receive payment. A "lack" of diligence by a party claiming estoppel is generally fatal, 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estoppel
& Waiver, Section 80, p. 721. The Court also determined
from the facts submitted that the consignee did in fact
rely on the carrier's Bills of Lading. In the instant case,
Climate Control admitted that they did not rely on Murphy's Bills of Lading in making payment but rather relied

12
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solely on the representations of American Standard that
the carrier charges were in fact prepaid by American
Standard (R 46-57).
It is respectfully submitted that the holdings of the
Missouri Pacific case and the Admiral case are not applicable to the case on appeal as Climate Control and American Standard have failed to establish, (1) that all four
Bills of Lading were marked "Prepaid", (2) that representations of prepayment were made by the carrier and
that they relied on such representations, and (3) that
they acted prudently and diligently prior to making payment.

POINT

III

THE COURT ERRED I N DENYING E. L.
MURPHY'S M O T I O N FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
As set forth in Section 223 of the Motor Carrier Act,
49 U.S.C. 323 and the cases decided under this section, the
consignee is generally liable for all freight charges not
paid by the consignor. This liability is further set forth
in Section 7 of the Uniform Straight Bills of Lading under
which the shipments to Climate Control were transported.
Section 7 of the Uniform Straight Bills of Lading
and Section 223 of the Motor Carrier Act are essentially
identical and state in pertinent part, "The owner or consignee shall pay the freight and average, if any, and all
other lawful charges accruing on said property . . . Only
if he (consignee) is an agent with no beneficial interest in
13
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the property which was shipped and has notified the carrier of that fact may a consignee avoid his liability for
payment of the freight charges/' (emphasis added) Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad v. Fink,
250 U.S. 577,40 S. Ct. 27, 63 L.Ed. 1151 (1919); Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Central Iron & Coal Co., 265 U.S. 59, 70,
44 S. Ct. 441, 444, 68 L. Ed. 900 (1924); Boston & Me.
R.R. v. Hannaford Bros., 144 Me. 306, 68 A.2d 1 (1949);
Central Warehouse Co. v. Chicago, R.I.&P. Ry., 20 F.2d
888 (8 Cir. 1927); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Rae,
118 N.Y.S. 2d 895, 203 Misc. 801 (1952); National Van
Lines, Inc. v. Herbert, 140 N . W . 2d 36, 81 S.D. 633,
(1966); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Harbin, 190 S.E.
2d 91, 126 Ga. App. 72 (1972).
The above cases support the rule that both the consignor and the consignee are both contractually and or
statutorily liable for all charges incident to goods transported by a carrier. However, recent cases have held that
the consignee's liability is not an absolute liability and
that the carrier may be estopped from enforcing its rights
if the carrier's conduct warrants such action. None of the
recent cases have held that a consignee may avoid liability
for unpaid carrier charges in the absence of estoppel.
In both the Admiral and the Missouri Railroad cases,
the defense of estoppel was upheld under the following
circumstances: (1) the consignee had paid the carrier
charges to the consignor, (2) all of the Bills of Lading
were marked "Prepaid", and (3) it was affirmatively
shown that the consignee relied on the prepayment nota-
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tion on the Bills of Lading. Under the above specific facts,
it was held that the consignee was not liable for unpaid
carrier charges.
In the instant case, however, the facts are substantially different: (1) The consignee did not pay the consignor, (2) All of the Bills of Lading were not marked
"Prepaid", and (3) The consignee affirmatively stated that
he did not rely on the carrier's Bills of Lading.
It is generally well settled that the effect of equitable
estoppel is to prevent the assertion of what would otherwise be an unequivocal right. State v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 175 Ind. 59, 93 N.E., 213 (1910); P. V.&K. Coal Co.
v. Kelly, 301 Ky. 186, 191 S.W. 2d. 231 (1954). Estoppel
serves to prevent losses otherwise unescapable. Peacock
v. Home, 159 Ga. 707, 126 S.E. 813 (1925); Sudden &
Christensen v. Crossett Western Lumber Co. (The Tarnpico), 270 F. 537 (9th Cir., 1921). In other words, but for
the estoppel, the consignee would be liable for the carrier
charges.
In an Oregon case just recently decided, the consignee
was held liable to a carrier for unpaid carrier charges even
though the consignee had paid the freight charges pursuant to a contract made with the consignor, Consolidated
Freigbtways Corp. v. Eddy, Supra.
In this case the defendant Eddy had a contract with a
shipper which provided that the shipper was responsible
for the freight charges. Eddy paid the shipper the contract
price in full which included the freight charges. The contracted shipment was transported by the carrier to Eddy
15
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"Collect". The carrier released the shipment to Eddy
without collecting the charges. Some two years later, and
after being unable to collect from the insolvent shipper,
the carrier brought suit against the consignee Eddy for the
unpaid carrier charges. Eddy alleged that the carrier's
transaction with the shipper involved an extension of
credit beyond the seven (7) day limit imposed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission and that he (Eddy) had
no knowledge when he paid the shipper that the shipment was collect.
The defendant (Eddy) set forth the affirmative defense of estoppel. The Court held that Eddy was liable
for the carrier charges as Eddy had failed in his answer
to allege that the Bills of Lading contained a notation
that the freight had been prepaid or that the consignee was
misled by representations or conduct of the carrier into
assuming that the freight charges had been prepaid.
In essence, the Oregon Court held that the consignee
was liable for payment of the carrier charges even though
the consignee had earlier paid the carrier charges to the
consignor.
The reason for the Court's holding was that the consignee had failed to adequately establish the elements
necessary to sustain their affirmative defense of estoppel.
In other words, the consignee failed to establish,
(1) that representations of prepayment were made
by the carrier to the consignee, and
(2) that the consignee relied on these representations
to their detriment.
16
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The Court suggests though that if the consignee had
been able to establish estoppel, the carrier would have
been estopped from collecting the unpaid freight charges
from the consignee.
In light of the above, E. L. Murphy submits that in
the absence of estoppel Climate Control is liable to
the carrier, either contractually or statutorily, for all unpaid carrier charges.

POINT

IV

THE COURT ERRED I N N O T CONSIDERING THE EQUITIES OF E. L. MURPHY
OR THE POLICIES T H A T MAY BE ESTABLISHED I N THE FUTURE A N D ITS EFFECT
ON MOTOR CARRIERS GENERALLY.
In all of the cases relied on by Climate Control and
American Standard, the parties and transactions involved were, for the most part, straightforward, eg., the consignor delivered the goods to the carrier for shipment to
the consignee under Bills of Lading marked "Prepaid".
The consignee then paid the consignor who in turn did
or did not pay the carrier.
However, in the case before the Court, the consignee
(Climate Control, Inc.) ordered the goods from a supplier, (American Standard, Inc.). The supplier in turn
contracted with B & M Trading to ship the goods to Climate Control, Inc. B & M Trading in turn contracted
with the consignor, East Coast Drayage Co., who con-
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tracted with the carrier, E. L. Murphy Co., to deliver the
goods to Climate Control. (See Exhibit "A".)
Climate Control paid American Standard and American Standard paid B & M Trading. It is not known
whether B & M Trading paid East Coast Drayage. However, it is known that East Coast Drayage, the consignor,
never did pay the carrier, E. L. Murphy.
Carriers are, in effect, servants of the public. This
means that unless E. L. Murphy had good cause, they
could not arbitrarily refuse to accept the goods from East
Coast Drayage for delivery, 46 USC 316. American Standard, on the other hand, voluntarily selected B & M Trading, presumably after careful investigation.
If the Court upholds the Summary Judgment granted
to Climate Control and American Standard, E. L. Murphy
believes that the door will be opened to encourage future
fraudulent transactions wherein the carrier will be unable to collect unpaid carrier charges from a consignee
whenever the consignee can establish that they had paid
a third party even though the third party is not named on
the Bills of Lading. In order to protect itself, the carrier
would have no alternative but to operate on a cash, noncredit basis. This would obviously be contrary to the
intent of the ICC which has just recently permitted carriers to extend credit under 9 C.F.R. 1322.1. The courts
should support this change in policy rather than hamper
it.
Further on the question of credit extension, the
Court's attention is respectfully directed to the fact that
it was American Standard who contacted B & M Trading
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to arrange for the shipment of goods to Salt Lake City.
Possibly, if American Standard exercised greater care in
selecting the shipper, this predicament would never have
arisen. Should the carrier be penalized for a supplier's
negligence or lack of diligence in selecting a shipper?
E. L. Murphy can further foresee that if the Summary
Judgment granted to Climate Control and American
Standard is upheld, an invitation shall be extended to
unscrupulous shippers and suppliers to collude and successfully bilk a carrier out of the charges due. The entire
risk in transporting freight would then fall on the carrier
who is in the poorest position of any of the parties to
determine the financial responsibility of the shipper. The
consignee or the supplier can conduct extensive credit
checks before letting out a contract for shipment. The carrier, however, which operates as a public service, and, for
the most part, is required by law to accept goods tendered to them for delivery, has little, if any, opportunity
to adequately protect itself from a collusive effort between a supplier and a shipper or to protect itself from a
potentially insolvent shipper.
If the equities of the carrier are not considered by the
courts, it will not be long before the I.C.C. will intervene
and make the consignee's liability absolute or in the alternative prevent any form of credit extension by the carrier.
CONCLUSION
It is Appellant's contention that Respondent's and
Co-Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment was
erroneously granted. It is Appellant's contention that the
record fails to establish that Appellant made any mislead19
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ing representations to the Respondent, and further that if
representations were made that the record fails to establish that the Respondent relied on those representations
and that such reliance was to their detriment. Instead, the
record, and particularly the Affidavit of John Dillon,
clearly establishes that payment of the carrier charges was
made on their own volition and in accordance with the
contract and invoices submitted to them by American
Standard, Inc.
Appellant further contends that the lower court's
action in denying Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment was in error as the case law supports Appellant's
position that in the absence of estoppel the consignee becomes statutorily and/or contractually liable to the carrier for unpaid freight charges.
Finally, Appellant submits that if a balance of equities is to be achieved, and if potentially fradulent transactions are to be avoided, liability of the consignee for
payment of the carrier charges must be established, particularly when parties beyond and those listed in the Bills
of Lading intercede.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD F. BOJANOWSKI
Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant
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EXHIBIT "A"
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